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ABSTRACT  
  The Supreme Court recently decided in Town of Chester v. Laroe 
Estates, Inc. that intervenors of right under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(a)(2) must demonstrate independent Article III standing 
when they pursue relief different from that requested by an original 
plaintiff. This decision resolved, in part, a decades-long controversy 
among the Courts of Appeals over the proper relationship between 
Rule 24 intervention and Article III standing that the Court first 
acknowledged in Diamond v. Charles. But the Court’s narrow decision 
in Town of Chester hardly disposed of the controversy, and Courts of 
Appeals are still free to require standing of defendant-intervenors and, 
it stands to reason, plaintiff-intervenors even if they do not pursue 
different relief.  
  With this debate yet unresolved, this Note takes a less conventional 
approach. In addition to arguing that the Supreme Court’s precedents 
implicitly resolved this question before Town of Chester, this Note 
argues that the nature of judicial decisions raises two concerns that a 
liberal application of Rule 24(a)(2) would mitigate. First, this Note 
argues that stare decisis limits the right of litigants to be heard on the 
merits of their claims and defenses in a way that undermines the 
principles of due process. Second, this Note argues that the process of 
judicial decisionmaking is fraught with potential epistemic problems 
that can produce suboptimal legal rules. After considering these two 
concerns, this Note argues that Rule 24(a)(2) is a better and more 
practical way to mitigate these problems than are Rule 24(a)(2)’s 
alternatives. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, a challenge to Indiana’s voter identification law came 
before the Seventh Circuit in Crawford v. Marion County Election 
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Board.1 Writing for the majority, Judge Richard Posner defended the 
identification laws as imposing merely “ordinary and widespread 
burdens”2 and accepted the trial judge’s finding that the data on voter 
suppression presented by the plaintiff-appellants were “totally 
unreliable.”3 Because no plaintiff had joined the suit alleging that they 
“intend[ed] not to vote because of the new law,” Judge Posner 
reasoned that “the motivation for the suit is simply that the law may 
require the Democratic Party and other organizational plaintiffs to 
work harder to get every last one of their supporters to the polls.”4 The 
plaintiffs, Judge Posner reckoned, were engaged in a politically 
motivated assault on a reasonable electoral regulation. On appeal to 
the Supreme Court,5 the plaintiffs-turned-petitioners lost in a 6–3 
decision. The Court, like Judge Posner, found “[t]he universally 
applicable requirements of Indiana’s voter-identification law [to be] 
eminently reasonable.”6  
Seven years later, a similar voter identification law came before 
the Seventh Circuit.7 Writing for the majority, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook—Judge Posner’s intellectual frenemy—concluded that 
the regulation was “amply justified by the valid interest in protecting 
the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.”8 But then the 
unexpected happened: a judge on the Seventh Circuit requested a vote 
for a rehearing en banc, which failed by an equally divided vote.9 
Unlike many rehearing orders, this one drew a fire-and-brimstone 
dissent from five of the acting judges. The dissenting judges excoriated 
the majority for its reliance on “downright goofy”10 evidence of voter 
fraud, noting that “[e]ven Fox News, whose passion for conservative 
causes has never been questioned, acknowledges that ‘Voter ID Laws 
Target Rarely Occurring Voter Fraud.’”11 “[I]f there is no actual 
 
 1. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 
(2008).  
 2. Id. at 954.  
 3. Id. at 952.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).  
 6. Id. at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 7. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 8. Id. at 755 (quoting Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204).  
 9. Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (5–5 vote). 
 10. Id. at 791 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc).  
 11. Id. (citing Voter ID Laws Target Rarely Occurring Voter Fraud, FOX NEWS: POLITICS 
(Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/24/voter-id-laws-target-rarely-
occurring-voter-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/7SAQ-CEW3]).  
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danger of [voter identification] fraud,” the dissent argued, “[t]here is 
only one motivation for imposing burdens on voting . . . and that is to 
discourage voting by persons likely to vote against the party 
responsible for imposing the burdens.”12 Crawford’s presumptively 
neutral voter identification laws were now, according to the dissent, 
presumptively political.  
The dissent was shocking for a number of reasons, not the least of 
which was its comparison of the Wisconsin law to a literal witch hunt.13 
Perhaps most shocking was the identity of the dissent’s author, Judge 
Richard Posner, who had teed up the Supreme Court’s affirmation of 
a similar voter identification law only seven years earlier in Crawford. 
Facing critics’ charges that he had recanted his position on voter 
identification laws, Judge Posner later explained his reversal on 
empirical, as opposed to legal or normative, grounds: he simply did not 
have enough information in Crawford to sniff out the Indiana statute’s 
political motivation.14 “[I]n common with many other judges,” Judge 
Posner explained, “I could not be confident that [my opinion] was 
right, since I am one of the judges who doesn’t understand the electoral 
process sufficiently well to be able to gauge the consequences of 
decisions dealing with that process.”15 
Federal judges often confront cases asking them to set precedent 
with less-than-complete information.16 Because of the function of stare 
decisis in the federal judiciary, these judgments often have far-reaching 
and functionally permanent consequences; Crawford, for instance, is 
unlikely to be overturned in the near future and, given its affirmation 
by the Supreme Court, the opinion binds parties not even remotely 
connected to the original litigation. At the trial level, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure provide a partial remedy. Rule 24(a)(2) offers a 
party the right to intervene in ongoing litigation provided that the party 
meet three conditions: (1) the applicant has an interest implicated by 
the suit that (2) will be impaired unless the existing party adequately 
 
 12. Id. at 796.  
 13. Id. at 795 (“As there is no evidence that voter impersonation fraud is a problem, how can 
the fact that a legislature says it’s a problem turn it into one? If the Wisconsin legislature says 
witches are a problem, shall Wisconsin courts be permitted to conduct witch trials?”).  
 14. Richard A. Posner, I Did Not ‘Recant’ on Voter ID Laws, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 27, 2013), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/115363/richard-posner-i-did-not-recant-my-opinion-voter-id 
[https://perma.cc/QW7X-CNKS].  
 15. Id. 
 16. For a discussion of the epistemic constraints of judicial decisionmaking, see infra Part 
II.B.2 . 
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represents it, and (3) the existing party is inadequately representing the 
interest.17 Thus, a party who might be affected by a given case—even if 
the effect is somewhat speculative18—has the right under Rule 24(a)(2) 
to make arguments the original party either refused or was 
incompetent to make, or to present additional evidence (of voter fraud, 
for example).19  
Although the text of Rule 24(a)(2) lays out only three 
requirements, several circuits have engrafted Article III’s standing 
requirements onto the Rule,20 creating an additional hurdle to third-
party intervention. As a result, federal courts in these circuits are 
denied potentially relevant information from parties not immediately 
bound by a given case. Those same parties are denied the ability to 
represent their interests in precedent-setting litigation, and because 
lower federal courts adhere rigidly to stare decisis, these parties are 
effectively prevented from challenging precedents once set.  
Academic commentary on the Rule 24(a)(2) circuit split has 
focused on whether Article III requires would-be intervenors to 
establish standing.21 After declining on several occasions to address this 
issue,22 the Supreme Court recently revisited this question in Town of 
 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
 18. For cases that recognize adverse stare decisis effect as a cognizable interest under Rule 
24(a)(2), see infra note 47 and accompanying text.  
 19. For example, the defendant-intervenors in Grutter v. Bollinger—a pro-affirmative action 
nonprofit and seventeen minority students seeking admission to the University of Michigan—
argued that they would advance certain defenses of affirmative action that the University, subject 
to “internal and external institutional pressures,” could not. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 
400 (6th Cir. 1999). The defendant-intervenors also argued that, because an adverse ruling would 
harm the University less than it would them, the University alone would “not defend the case as 
vigorously as [would] the proposed intervenors.” Id.  
 20. For cases in which courts of appeals have held that intervenors under Rule 24(a)(2) need 
to show Article III standing, see infra note 79.  
 21. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 463 (1991) (suggesting 
a “pragmatic, equitable recalibration” of the approach to standing and Rule 24); Amy M. 
Gardner, Comment, An Attempt to Intervene in the Confusion: Standing Requirements for Rule 
24 Intervenors, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 684 (2002) (arguing that intervention should be allowed so 
long as “the original parties remain in the suit and meet the requirements for standing”); Juliet 
Johnson Karastelev, Note, On the Outside Seeking in: Must Intervenors Demonstrate Standing To 
Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DUKE L.J. 455, 480 (2002) (arguing that requiring Article III standing of an 
intervenor should depend on the type of relief sought); Kerry C. White, Note, Rule 24(a) 
Intervention of Right: Why the Federal Courts Should Require Standing to Intervene, 36 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 527, 530 (2002) (arguing in favor of applying standing requirements to intervenors).  
 22. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1986) (“We need not decide today 
whether a party seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements 
of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III.”).  
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Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.23 In a unanimous opinion, the Court 
narrowly held that intervenors under Rule 24(a)(2) must establish 
independent standing when the intervenor pursues relief not requested 
by a plaintiff.24 As several commentators have noted,25 the result in 
Town of Chester leaves open the question of whether an intervenor 
who seeks the same relief as a plaintiff needs to show independent 
Article III standing. The opinion also leaves unanswered the question 
of whether intervenors who seek no relief at all—including defendant-
intervenors, in most cases—need to satisfy Article III standing. With 
these questions still open,26 this Note argues that the quasi-legislative 
character of judicial decisions and decisionmaking militates against 
imposing Article III standing on Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors when the 
intervenors do not request different relief. 
Specifically, this Note argues that when judicial decisionmaking 
creates a quasi-legislative rule, as is the case with most opinions, courts’ 
use of Article III standing to exclude would-be intervenors from this 
process raises two interrelated concerns. First, excluding additional 
parties decreases the volume and, potentially, the quality of 
information entering the process, thereby increasing the probability 
that the court will generate bad precedent. This is especially true when 
the original party’s representation of a given interest is inadequate, a 
possibility the text of Rule 24(a)(2) openly acknowledges.27 Second, a 
court’s ruling effectively binds all future litigants within its jurisdiction. 
To varying extents, future litigants are thus denied the opportunity to 
be heard on the merits of their claims and defenses. Although this 
 
 23. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) 
 24. Id. at 1648. 
 25. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Opinion Analysis: Standing, Intervention, and a Narrow 
Disposition, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2017, 2:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinion-
analysis-standing-intervention-narrow-disposition [https://perma.cc/H2WQ-4CJZ] (“The court’s 
narrow decision did not expressly address . . . [whether] an intervenor need[s to] show standing if 
its litigation activities do not extend beyond asserting the same claim for the same remedies as 
the original plaintiff.”).  
 26. The Court’s opinion left open the possibility that standing could be required of 
intervenors seeking the same relief. Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1647 (“Thus, at the least, an 
intervenor of right must demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief beyond 
that which the plaintiff requests.” (emphasis added)).  
 27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (entitling an interested party to intervene if their interest will 
be impaired “unless existing parties adequately represent that interest”); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) 
advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendment (“The general purpose of original Rule 
24(a)(2) was to entitle an absentee, purportedly represented by a party, to intervene in the action 
if he could establish with fair probability that the representation was inadequate.”).  
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denial does not violate procedural due process, it does undermine the 
principles underlying the doctrine.  
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the circuit split, 
arguing that, despite Supreme Court rulings suggesting some 
resolution, the debate as to whether Article III applies or ought to 
apply to Rule 24(a)(2) intervention remains open. To the extent that 
the Supreme Court has considered the issue, its precedents suggest that 
Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors requesting the same relief need not 
demonstrate independent Article III standing. Part II considers the 
scope and effect of stare decisis, arguing that the doctrine—if not for 
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention—denies the federal judiciary potentially 
important information and denies would-be intervenors the ability to 
fully defend their interests. For instance, the Seventh Circuit is among 
the minority of circuits requiring independent Article III standing of 
Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors.28 Were it otherwise, the court in Crawford 
could have benefited from the intervention of public interest groups 
specializing in election law, such as the Brennan Center for Justice, 
which was relegated to filing an amicus brief.29 Finally, Part III 
evaluates the alternatives to Rule 24(a)(2) intervention—namely, the 
amicus brief and the political process—and ultimately argues that Rule 
24 without a standing requirement best guards against the process 
errors discussed in Part II.  
I.  THE PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE III STANDING, RULE 24(A)(2), AND 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT  
While the majority of this Note focuses on the information- and 
equity-related arguments against engrafting Article III’s standing 
requirement onto Rule 24(a)(2) intervention, this Part focuses on the 
doctrine underlying Rule 24 intervention and standing, and the 
purposes both are meant to serve. This Part also argues that recent 
developments in standing jurisprudence cast serious doubt on some 
courts’ arguments for requiring Article III standing of Rule 24(a)(2) 
intervenors.  
 
 28. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 984–85 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 29. For a discussion of the Brennan Center’s brief in Crawford, see infra note 232 and 
accompanying text.  
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A. Rule 24(a)(2), Then and Now 
Though it has some antecedents in Roman and civil law, the right 
to intervene in ongoing litigation is a relatively recent development in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence.30 As with compulsory joinder under 
Rule 19 and class action under Rule 23, Rule 24 intervention arose in 
response to the modern recognition that “a lawsuit often is not merely 
a private fight and will have implications on those not named as 
parties.”31 Rule 24(b), the “permissive” subdivision of Rule 24, grants 
judges discretion to allow intervention by a party who has a 
“conditional right to intervene by a federal statute”32 or “a claim or 
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or 
fact.”33 Rule 24(a)(2), by contrast, allows intervention “of right,” 
removing judges’ discretion to disallow intervention so long as the 
would-be intervenor meets the Rule’s conditions.34 After its last 
substantive amendment in 1966, Rule 24(a)(2) reads, in relevant part: 
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who 
. . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the 
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to 
protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that 
interest.35 
It is worth noting that Rule 24(a)(2) emphasizes the “practical” 
nature of the impediment or impairment that triggers intervention of 
right. The pre-1966 Rule 24(a)(2) required that “the applicant [actually 
or potentially] be bound by a judgment in the action”36 before she had 
the right to intervene. Though a minority of courts interpreted 
“bound” to mean practical prejudice,37 a 1961 Supreme Court ruling 
 
 30. See James Wm. Moore & Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention I. The Right To Intervene 
and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 568–70 (1935).  
 31. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1901, at 258 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter 7C WRIGHT & MILLER].  
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(A). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B). 
 34. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1902, at 261 (noting that, unlike Rule 24(b)’s 
appeal to judicial discretion, Rule 24(a)(2) “seems to pose only a question of law”). 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added).  
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendment.  
 37. See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“We 
are of the opinion . . . [that] the res judicata test for determining whether an applicant for 
intervention in the action will be bound by the judgment therein is unworkable and 
inappropriate.”). This was a fairly squishy standard. The Third Circuit, for example, required only 
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affirmed the majority interpretation of “bound” as analogous to res 
judicata.38 The 1966 amendment intentionally broadened harm 
cognizable under Rule 24(a)(2) to include not only res judicata, but 
“practical” impairment as well.39 Furthermore, the 1966 amendment 
redefined the “interest” required from “an interest in property” to one 
also recognizing “less tangible interests.”40 The aggregate force of these 
changes was to “abandon[] formalistic restrictions in favor of ‘practical 
considerations’ to allow courts to reach pragmatic solutions to 
intervention problems.”41 As a result, the decade following the 
amendment saw a dramatic increase in public interest litigation—the 
reformed Rule 24(a)(2) had become better equipped to recognize the 
“relatively intangible, abstract” interests these organizations 
represent.42  
With greater scope came greater confusion. Whereas the more 
limited remit of the pre-1966 Rule lent itself to relatively 
straightforward judicial application,43 the liberalized post-1966 Rule 
has proven considerably harder to apply.44 In particular, the bounds of 
what can be considered a Rule 24(a)(2) “interest” are ill-defined,45 and 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this point has provided unclear 
guidance.46  
 
that an applicant’s rights would be “affected” by an adverse decision. Mack v. Passaic Nat’l Bank 
& Trust Co., 150 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1945). 
 38. See Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961) (“We regard it as fully 
settled that a person whose private interests coincide with the public interest in government 
antitrust litigation is nonetheless not bound by the eventuality of such litigation, and hence may 
not, as of right, intervene in it.”).  
 39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendment (“The 
[amended rule] imports practical considerations, and the deletion of the ‘bound’ language 
similarly frees the rule from undue preoccupation with strict considerations of res judicata.”).  
 40. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 252–53 n.164 (1990). But see 
Tobias, supra note 21, at 429–32 (noting that the intent behind the 1966 amendment “remains 
unclear and controversial”).  
 41. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984); see 
also 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1901, at 257–60 (noting that Rules 19, 23, and 24 are 
“an effort to strike a balance between varying interests”).  
 42. Tobias, supra note 21, at 419.  
 43. Id. at 422. 
 44. Id. at 432.  
 45. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1908.1, at 300 (“There is not any clear 
definition of the nature of the ‘interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject 
of action’ that is required for intervention of right.”).  
 46. See id. (“The Supreme Court has spoken to the question [of what constitutes an ‘interest’ 
under Rule 24] twice since the rule was amended in 1966, but those cases generally have been 
limited to their somewhat unique facts.”).  
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What is certain is that the post-1966 Rule 24(a)(2) opens the door 
to parties attempting to protect interests that would not normally 
constitute the “concrete” and “actual or imminent” injury Article III 
standing requires. For instance, numerous circuits have recognized the 
potential for adverse precedent as a cognizable interest under Rule 
24(a)(2).47  
B. Article III Standing 
In marked contrast to Rule 24’s court-opening force, the standing 
requirement of Article III determines “whether the litigant is entitled 
to have the court decide the merits [of his dispute].”48 Article III 
standing derives from the Constitution’s Case or Controversy Clause,49 
which establishes the scope of the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction. The 
“irreducible minimum” of Article III standing is: (1) a distinct and 
actual injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant 
and that (3) will be redressed if the Court renders a favorable 
decision.50  
 
 47. See, e.g., Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he 
potential for negative stare decisis effect ‘may supply that practical disadvantage which warrants 
intervention of right.’” (quoting Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1214 (11th Cir. 1989))); 
Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Utah Ass’n 
of Ctys. v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he stare decisis effect of the district 
court’s judgment is sufficient impairment for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2).” (quoting Coal. 
of Ariz./N.M. Ctys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 
2001))); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 109–10 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“[T]he stare 
decisis effect of an adverse judgment constitutes a sufficient impairment to compel 
intervention.”); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 732 F.2d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting 
intervention “primarily to guard against encountering the stare decisis effect of a decision in favor 
of the defendants”); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“We think that under 
[the post-1966-amendment Rule 24(a)(2)] stare decisis principles may in some cases supply the 
practical disadvantage that warrants intervention as of right.”). But see Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. 
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. L.L.C., 550 B.R. 241, 253 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (suggesting that 
the court in Nuesse “observed that it would not apply Rule 24 literally to atypical cases such as 
the one before it”). 
 48. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).  
 49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . . [and] to Controversies to which the 
United States shall be a Party . . . .”).  
 50. As the Supreme Court has explained:  
[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, 
the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not 
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action 
of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to 
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”  
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Standing has also traditionally comprised several prudential 
limitations,51 though the status of prudential standing is now in 
question. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc.,52 the Supreme Court reaffirmed “the principle that ‘a federal 
court’s obligation to hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction ‘is 
virtually unflagging.’”53 As a result, “prudential” doctrines not 
grounded in Article III’s Case or Controversy requirement—such as 
the zone-of-interests test—are now presumptively unconstitutional.54 
It is difficult to know whether Lexmark signifies the “end of prudential 
standing,”55 as some academic commentary has suggested.56 
Regardless, Lexmark can at least be seen to affirm the proposition that, 
once jurisdiction is established, standing cannot be used as a prudential 
bar to limit the public’s access to the federal judiciary.  
Of particular concern to this Note is Lexmark’s elevation of the 
ban on generalized grievances to Article III status. The prohibition on 
generalized grievances—the adjudication of “abstract questions of 
wide public significance”57—exists “to limit the role of the courts in 
resolving public disputes.”58 Whereas Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife59 
had already arguably incorporated the prohibition on generalized 
 
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (first alteration added) (quoting Whitmore 
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); then quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26, 38, 41–42, 43 (1976)) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); then citing 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); then citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–
741 n.16 (1972)). 
 51. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (“Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has 
also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing.”). The three 
principles of prudential standing are: (1) the prohibition against asserting the rights of third 
parties, (2) the prohibition of generalized grievances, and (3) the requirement that a plaintiff’s 
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by a given statute or constitutional guarantee. 
See id. at 474–75 (listing and explaining the three principles of prudential standing).  
 52. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).  
 53. Id. at 1386 (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)).  
 54. See id. at 1387 n.3 (categorizing the ban on generalized grievances as an Article III 
requirement and declining to decide the “proper place” of third-party standing limitations).  
 55. Michael Ramsey, Lexmark v. Static Control: The End of Prudential Standing?, 
ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 27, 2014), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/
2014/03/lexmark-v-static-control-the-end-of-prudential-standingmichael-ramsey.html [https://per
ma.cc/BS77-69B7].  
 56. For a more nuanced discussion of Lexmark and prudential standing, see generally Ernest 
A. Young, Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149 (2014).  
 57. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).  
 58. Id.  
 59. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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grievances into Article III standing,60 Lexmark made clear that the 
prohibition rests on “constitutional reasons, not ‘prudential’ ones.”61 
This represents a further tightening of standing doctrine begun by the 
Rehnquist Court.62 In contrast to the Warren Court’s more lenient view 
of Article III standing, which allowed plaintiffs to bring suits even if 
they were not demonstrably more injured than the general public,63 the 
modern doctrine of standing requires that a plaintiff have suffered “an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and 
particularized,”64 such that she is “‘directly’ affected apart from [her] 
‘special interest in th[e] subject.”65 For instance, a plaintiff who seeks 
under the Endangered Species Act66 to challenge a federal project will 
not have standing merely on the basis of her special interest in a 
particular endangered species.67 But once she forms “concrete plans”68 
to see that species, such as by buying a plane ticket to the project site,69 
her injury becomes concrete and particularized. Accordingly, such a 
plaintiff would be well on her way to satisfying the requirements of 
Article III standing. 
At first glance, it is not entirely clear why Rule 24 intervention 
should require a showing of Article III standing. Quite apart from the 
fact that Rule 24’s text nowhere mentions standing, the requirements 
of standing are almost antithetical to Rule 24’s requirements. Rule 24 
 
 60. In Lujan, the Supreme Court explained that, in addition to having a concrete and 
particularized injury, the plaintiff must be “‘directly’ affected apart from [her] ‘special interest in 
th[e] subject.’” Id. at 563 (second alteration in original) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 
727, 739 (1972)). However, the Court later explained in Elk Grove Unified School District v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) that the prohibition on generalized grievances was part of “prudential 
standing . . . [which is] closely related to Art. III concerns but [is] essentially [a] matter[] of judicial 
self-governance.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12.  
 61. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3 (2014).  
 62. However, it should be acknowledged that the Roberts Court has liberalized standing in 
a number of ways as well. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 292 
(2008) (granting standing to assignees to pursue claims for money owed even when the assignee 
has promised to remit the proceeds to the assignor); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 
(2007) (allowing Massachusetts to challenge the EPA’s denial of a rulemaking petition); Young, 
supra note 56, at 157–58 (explaining that Lexmark “may have the unintended consequence of 
loosening the causation element of constitutional standing”).  
 63. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1968) (finding taxpayer standing sufficient 
to contest federal funding of parochial schools).  
 64. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  
 65. Id. at 563 (second alteration in original) (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735, 739).  
 66. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012).  
 67. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  
 68. Id. at 564.  
 69. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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is broad enough to protect “relatively intangible [and] abstract”70 
interests, including the potentially adverse effects of stare decisis;71 
standing’s injury requirement, on the other hand, demands that the 
plaintiff show she “‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining some direct injury’ . . . [that is] both ‘real and immediate,’ 
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”72 Rule 24 asks whether the 
plaintiff’s interest might be impaired as a result of inadequate 
representation,73 which requires a judge to make a predictive, practical 
determination; standing requires that the there be a “causal 
connection” between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s 
conduct,74 which requires a judge to make a retrospective empirical and 
legal determination. Rule 24 requires a showing that the plaintiff’s 
interest will “as a practical matter” be “impair[ed]”;75 standing’s 
redressability prong requires the plaintiff to show that her requested 
relief will likely redress, not merely mitigate, her alleged injury.76 
Perhaps most significant, whereas Rule 24(a)(2) is a filtering 
mechanism meant to distinguish between parties who are entitled to 
intervene and parties who are not, Article III standing is a 
jurisdictional concept that defines and thereby limits the scope of the 
federal judiciary’s power.77 Once Article III standing is satisfied by the 
 
 70. Tobias, supra note 21, at 419.  
 71. For cases that recognize adverse stare decisis effect as a cognizable interest under Rule 
24(a)(2), see supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
 72. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983).  
 73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (entitling an interested party to intervene if their interest will 
be impaired “unless existing parties adequately represent that interest”). 
 74. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).  
 76. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) for instance, the Court denied the parents of black 
public schoolchildren standing to challenge the IRS’s failure to revoke the tax-exempt status of 
racially discriminatory private schools. Even though plaintiff’s “request might have a substantial 
effect on the desegregation of public schools,” the Court denied standing because the children’s 
inability to attend desegregated schools “might not be traceable to IRS violations of the law.” 
Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19. 
 77. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (“[Standing] 
preserves the ‘tripartite structure’ of our Federal Government, prevents the Federal Judiciary 
from ‘intrud[ing] upon the powers given to the other branches,’ and ‘confines the federal courts 
to a properly judicial role.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 
S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016))); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (“Federal judicial power is limited 
to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated 
powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial 
process.”); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220 
(1993) (“The legitimacy of an unelected, life-tenured judiciary in our democratic republic is 
bolstered by the constitutional limitation of that judiciary’s power in Article III to actual ‘cases’ 
and ‘controversies.’”).  
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original parties, using standing as an additional filter against 
intervening parties displaces the role of Rule 24(a)(2).  
C. The Minority Circuits’ Approaches, Considered  
The majority of circuits allow Rule 24 intervention without a 
showing of Article III standing.78 The minority position—articulated 
by the Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. circuits—requires that a Rule 24 
intervenor satisfy Article III standing.79 The minority circuits’ position 
rests on three distinct but interrelated justifications, which I refer to as 
the categorical approach, the floodgates concern, and the equal footing 
rationale. 
1. The Eighth Circuit’s Categorical Approach.  The first rationale, 
articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Mausolf v. Babbitt,80 concerns the 
supposed threat to Article III jurisdiction that intervenors pose. 
Though the court recognized that “Rule 24(a) speaks to practical 
concerns . . . [and] promotes the efficient and orderly use of judicial 
resources by [consolidating litigation],”81 the Eighth Circuit took the 
categorical position that “an Article III case or controversy, once 
joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an 
Article III case or controversy.”82  
Though it is generally undisputed that federal jurisdiction turns on 
the invoking party’s satisfaction of Article III standing,83 applying this 
requirement to all intervening parties presents two issues. First, the 
consensus among commentators is that only the plaintiff invoking the 
 
 78. See, e.g., Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated, 
137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017); King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 245–46 (3d Cir. 2014); Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2011); City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 
1183–84 (10th Cir. 2010); Dillard v. Chilton Cty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1336–37 & n.10 (11th 
Cir. 2007); United States v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 
814, 829–30 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 79. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 984–85 (7th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833–34, 833 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 80. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996).  
 81. Id. at 1300.  
 82. Id. 
 83. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3531, at 4–6 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 13A WRIGHT & MILLER] (“The party 
focused upon [in standing inquiries] is almost invariably the plaintiff. . . . [O]rdinarily the role of 
defendants is considered only in determining whether they have caused the injury complained of 
and whether an order directed to them will redress that injury.”).  
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court’s jurisdiction must satisfy Article III standing.84 This position 
accords with Lexmark’s interpretation of the purpose behind Article 
III standing: to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim “presents a case 
or controversy that is properly within federal courts’ Article III 
jurisdiction.”85 Standing is a subject-matter limitation, and a court’s 
jurisdiction, once vested, cannot be destroyed unless the original case 
or controversy disappears.86 The minority position, by contrast, treats 
standing as a freestanding set of criteria that all intervenors—even 
defendants who are not traditionally required to demonstrate 
standing87—must satisfy. 
Second, the Eighth Circuit’s bright-line position—that adding any 
party who lacks Article III standing destroys federal jurisdiction over 
a case—is irreconcilable with the circuit’s treatment of permissive 
intervention under Rule 24(b). For example, in Flynt v. Lombardi88 the 
Eighth Circuit allowed an intervenor under Rule 24(b) despite 
acknowledging that the intervenor lacked Article III standing.89 
Because the intervenor sought only to unseal legal documents rather 
than to litigate, the court reasoned that “an independent basis of 
jurisdiction [was] not required.”90 This approach—examining the 
intervenor’s purpose and determining whether it demands 
independent standing—contrasts strongly with the Eighth Circuit’s 
approach in Mausolf, in which the inclusion of a party lacking Article 
III standing destroyed jurisdiction irrespective of the party’s motive.91 
If the Eighth Circuit in Mausolf was correct on this point, Flynt appears 
incorrectly decided, given that there is no principled distinction 
 
 84. See Karastelev, supra note 21, at 470–71 & n.98 (citing cases and commentary arguing 
that only the plaintiff needs to have standing to establish a justiciable case or controversy). 
 85. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014).  
 86. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 832 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Once a valid Article III case-or-
controversy is present, the court’s jurisdiction vests. The presence of additional parties, although 
they alone could independently not satisfy Article III’s requirements, does not of itself destroy 
jurisdiction already established.”). For Supreme Court precedent suggesting that jurisdiction is 
not destroyed by the presence of parties lacking Article III standing, see infra Part I.D. 
 87. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (explaining that standing applies to “the party who invokes the court’s 
authority”); 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 83, § 3531, at 4–6. But see Arizonans for Official 
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (“Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or-
controversy requirement.” (emphasis added)).  
 88. Flynt v. Lombardi, 782 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 89. Id. at 967.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996). 
FERGUSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2017  12:13 PM 
2017] RULE 24 NOTWITHSTANDING 203 
between Rule 24(a)(2) and Rule 24(b) intervenors vis-à-vis Article 
III.92 
The larger issue with the Eighth Circuit’s position in Mausolf is 
that it effectively writes Rule 24(b) out of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 24(b) allows permissive intervention if the party “has 
a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question 
of law or fact.”93 If, as these courts believe, Rule 24(a)(2)’s interest 
requirement does not satisfy Article III, then Rule 24(b), which exists 
to accommodate parties whose interest is not sufficient under Rule 
24(a)(2),94 is without any meaning. How could a party’s interest be 
sufficient to satisfy Article III yet insufficient to qualify for 
intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)?95 Requiring Article III standing of 
Rule 24(b) intervenors leaves the Rule without any conceivable 
application.  
2. The “Floodgates” Concern.  Another oft-cited rationale for the 
minority position is that allowing intervention without Article III 
standing would permit “any organization or individual with only a 
philosophic identification with a defendant—or a concern with a 
possible unfavorable precedent . . . to intervene and influence the 
 
 92. A similar problem confronts the Eighth Circuit’s treatment of Rule 19 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that a party be joined to existing litigation if “that person 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action 
in the person’s absence may . . . impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)–(B)(i). Rule 19’s language is almost identical to that of Rule 24, and, 
according to the Eighth Circuit, the consequences of joining a party under Rule 19 who lacks 
standing should be the same as doing so under Rule 24. Yet in applying Rule 19, the Eighth Circuit 
does not inquire into the joined party’s standing. See, e.g., Two Shields v. Wilkinson, 790 F.3d 791, 
798 (8th Cir. 2015) (omitting standing as a factor relevant to Rule 19 analysis); see also Karastelev, 
supra note 21, at 470 (noting the Rule 19 issue).  
 93. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B).  
 94. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1911, at 450–68 (explaining that Rule 24(b) 
exists to allow intervention where Rule 24(a)(2) would not); see also SEC v. U.S. Realty & 
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459 (1940) (“[Rule 24(b)] plainly dispenses with any requirement 
that the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the 
litigation.”). 
 95. For example, let’s say our plaintiff from Lujan wants to intervene in an ongoing ESA 
suit, and her claims share a question of law or fact with the plaintiff’s claims. Suppose, though, 
that her interest in the particular endangered species is not strong enough to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2), 
meaning that it is also not strong enough to satisfy Article III standing (as she cannot have an 
injury without at least a strong interest). Will her Rule 24(b) motion succeed if she is required to 
satisfy Article III standing? No: she will fail because, given that she didn’t have an interest 
sufficient for a Rule 24(a)(2) motion, she will not be able to satisfy Article III standing a fortiori. 
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course of litigation.”96 As articulated by the Eighth Circuit, the fear is 
that courts will be turned into “judicial versions of college debating 
forums.”97 The circuits’ concern with misuse of judicial resources is 
laudable, but the fear is misplaced.  
First, it is doubtful as an empirical matter that the minority 
circuits’ fear—that removing Article III standing from Rule 24 
intervention will open the floodgates to any merely interested party—
has come to pass in the majority of circuits allowing intervention 
without standing.98 Second, Rule 24(a)(2) contains three limiting 
criteria, all of which the prospective intervenor must meet.99 It is 
unlikely that someone with a merely “philosophic identification” with 
a given defendant would have a sufficient interest under Rule 24(a)(2) 
or be able to show how an adverse ruling would “impair or impede” 
her ability to protect the interest.  
Even if this is fear were well founded, Article III standing would 
be the wrong way to address it. Recall that the Supreme Court in 
Lexmark clarified that standing is strictly a matter of jurisdiction, not 
prudence, by reiterating the “virtually unflagging” requirement that 
“‘a federal court[] . . . hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction.”100 
In the wake of Lexmark, the D.C. Circuit in Crossroads Grassroots 
Policy Strategies v. FEC101 discontinued its application of the zone-of-
interest test—a prudential rather than Article III standing 
requirement—to Rule 24 intervenors.102 Despite proclaiming in 
Crossroads that “there is no need for another layer of judge-made 
 
 96. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. FDIC, 717 F.3d 189, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., 
concurring).  
 97. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)).  
 98. Though an imperfect proxy, the time period from filing date to final trial disposition is 
longest in district courts of the Seventh Circuit (12.6 months), which applies Article III to 
intervenors, and shortest in district courts of the Eleventh Circuit (8.48 months), which allows 
intervenors without regard to standing. See U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT 
STATISTICS – COMPARISON WITHIN CIRCUIT – DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING JUNE 
30, 2016 (June 30, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_dist
comparison0630.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XNT-PFUL].  
 99. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1908, at 295 (“As amended in 1966, Rule 
24(a)(2) creates a threefold test for intervention of right . . . .”); see FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) 
(requiring that intervenors under 24(a)(2) demonstrate a protectable interest that may be 
impaired unless the intervenor is allowed to defend it). 
 100. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) 
(quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)).  
 101. Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. FEC, 788 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir, 2015). 
 102. Id. at 319.  
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prudential considerations to deny intervention,”103 the court cited 
approvingly to a concurrence advocating for the prudential use of 
Article III standing in Rule 24 cases.104 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit did 
not technically violate Lexmark insofar as it did not resurrect the 
prudential standing limitations Lexmark interred. However, by 
appealing to a prudential (as opposed to jurisdictional) motivation for 
invoking Article III standing, the D.C. Circuit violated the idea behind 
Lexmark—that Article III standing is meant only to define jurisdiction.  
3. The “Equal Footing” Rationale.  The final rationale underlying 
the minority position is that if an “intervenor seeks to participate on an 
equal footing with the original parties to the suit, he must satisfy the 
standing requirements imposed on those parties.”105 Because “an 
intervenor may be seeking relief different from that sought by and of 
the original parties . . . [which] may make it really a new case,”106 and 
because no case can be sustained without Article III standing, the 
potentially case-shifting intervenor must have standing. This is a fair 
concern, as Rule 24 intervenors are presumptively107 given full-party 
status, allowing them to participate in practically all aspects of the 
trial.108 If an intervenor so changes the focus of a case such that it no 
longer centers on the original plaintiff’s claims, the adjudicating court 
may no longer have jurisdiction.  
But this position overlooks two important points. First, many 
parties who seek to intervene do so only to present different arguments 
or evidence, not to request different relief.109 In these cases, 
intervention functions in a similar way to an amicus brief, but with 
 
 103. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).  
 104. Id. The case to which the court referred was Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. FDIC, 717 
F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 2013), in which Judge Silberman explained that “[the D.C. Circuit’s] rule 
requiring all intervenors to demonstrate Article III standing prudently guards against [undue 
intervention by third parties].” Id. at 195. 
 105. City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  
 106. City of Chicago v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 107. However, for a discussion of courts’ authority to limit intervenors’ powers under Rule 
24(a)(2), see infra notes 112–113.  
 108. See, e.g., Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]s a general rule, 
intervenors are permitted to litigate fully once admitted to a suit.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1997))). 
 109. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the 
intervenor sought to make arguments that “institutional pressures” prevented the original party 
from making).  
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important differences.110 Some parties intervene for much more limited 
purposes, which may entail virtually no participation in the litigation.111 
Second, this position overlooks the authority Rule 24 gives courts to 
limit the participation of intervening parties. To be sure, the text of 
Rule 24 confers no such power, but the Advisory Committee’s note to 
the 1966 amendment grants courts broad, discretionary power to 
condition intervenors’ activities.112 This power is widely recognized113 
and compares favorably with Article III standing as a means of limiting 
intervenor participation. Whereas Article III categorically rejects a 
class of intervenors who might contribute valuably to the resolution of 
a case, imposing limits under Rule 24 allows judges to take advantage 
of the perspective and information offered by intervenors while 
avoiding potential procedural complications.  
 
 110. For a consideration of why intervention is superior to an amicus brief for most parties, 
see infra Part III.B.1.  
 111. For instance, some parties intervene to obtain information they can access only as a 
party. See, e.g., Flynt v. Lombardi, 782 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2015) (permitting a party to 
intervene who only sought to modify a protective order); Haworth v. Steelcase, Inc., 12 F.3d 1090, 
1092 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming the lower court’s refusal to allow a party to intervene who was 
seeking discovery relevant to a parallel litigation with one of the original parties). Other parties 
seek to intervene as neutral participants in settlement negotiations. See, e.g., United States v. 
Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2009) (refusing to permit the intervention 
of a Missouri trade association in settlement negotiations between the United States, Missouri, 
and the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District for violations of the Clean Water Act).  
 112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendment (“An 
intervention of right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or 
restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the 
proceedings.”). Courts often will limit the intervenor’s ability to raise new claims. See, e.g., Brady 
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 n.8 (D.D.C. 2009) (allowing 
parties to intervene “subject to limitations prohibiting them from raising claims outside the scope 
of those raised by the original parties or from raising collateral issues”). Courts also frequently 
limit the intervenor’s discovery. See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 
560, 565–66 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (limiting intervenors’ “ability to initiate unilateral independent 
discovery without leave of the court”). 
 113. See, e.g., Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 528 (1972) (remanding 
to “allow limited intervention” under Rule 24); Forest Cty. Potawatomi Cmty. v. United States, 
317 F.R.D. 6, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[I]t is now a firmly established principle that reasonable 
conditions may be imposed even upon one who intervenes as of right.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Beauregard, Inc. v. Sword Servs. L.L.C., 107 F.3d 351, 352–53 (5th Cir. 1997))); United 
States v. Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d 1386, 1396 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); Dacotah Chapter of Sierra 
Club v. Salazar, No. 1:12-cv-065, 2012 WL 3686742, at *2 (D.N.D. Aug. 27, 2012) (same); Florida 
Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, No. 3:78-cv-178-J-34MCR, 2011 WL 
4459387, at *11 n.13 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2011) (same); United States v. Arch Coal, Inc., No. 2:11-
0133, 2011 WL 2493072, at *12 (S.D. W. Va. June 22, 2011) (same); TiVo Inc. v. AT & T Inc., No. 
2:09-CV-259, 2010 WL 10922068, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010) (same). 
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D. The Supreme Court’s Sub Silentio Treatment  
The Supreme Court has expressly declined to resolve whether 
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention requires Article III standing when the 
movant does not seek different relief.114 Though the Court has not 
supplied a definitive answer, it has “sub silentio” endorsed the majority 
position.115 In Diamond v. Charles,116 the Court ruled that when the 
original party declines to appeal a judgment, an intervenor must 
demonstrate separate Article III standing to appeal.117 This makes 
perfect sense: the original plaintiff in Diamond, the State of Illinois, 
dropped out of the litigation after the court of appeals’ decision, taking 
with it the original case or controversy and, a fortiori, the Supreme 
Court’s Article III jurisdiction.118 But “[h]ad the State sought 
review . . . Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also would be 
entitled to seek review, enabling him to file a brief on the merits, and 
to seek leave to argue orally.”119 That is, Diamond would have been 
treated as a full party, but his “ability to ride ‘piggyback’ on the State’s 
undoubted standing exist[ed] only if the State [had] in fact [been] an 
appellant before the Court.”120 Though the Court in Diamond declined 
to define the general relationship between Article III and Rule 
24(a)(2), the Court’s dictum suggests that standing-less intervenors are 
able to “piggyback” on the standing of the original plaintiff.121 
Since Diamond, the Supreme Court has given more authority to 
Diamond’s dictum, albeit obliquely. In McConnell v. FEC,122 the Court 
considered a challenge to sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act defended by the FEC and numerous defendant-intervenors. 
 
 114. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1986) (“We need not decide today whether 
a party seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 
24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III.”).  
 115. Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[I]t is fair to say 
that while the Supreme Court has not explicitly endorsed our approach, it has sub silentio 
permitted parties to intervene in cases that satisfy the ‘case or controversy’ requirement without 
determining whether those parties independently have standing.”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1645 
(2017).  
 116. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
 117. Id. at 68.  
 118. Id. at 63–64.  
 119. Id. at 64.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
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Though one plaintiff raised the issue of intervenor standing,123 the 
Court ultimately ruled on the merits of the suit without determining 
that the defendant-intervenors had standing.124 As the Court explained, 
because “the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) has standing . . . we 
need not address the standing of the intervenor-defendants, whose 
position here is identical to the FEC’s.”125 In other words, the Court 
considered the defendant-intervenors’ standing irrelevant because 
they had made substantially the same arguments as the FEC, which did 
have standing.  
Though this sentence sounds like a bit of forgettable throat 
clearing, it is significant given McConnell’s procedural posture. 
Whereas Diamond was a case about Article III jurisdiction, McConnell 
was decided on the merits. Accordingly, McConnell had to have 
presented a justiciable case or controversy or else the Court would not 
have had jurisdiction to rule on the merits.126 But if the minority’s, 
particularly the Eighth Circuit’s, interpretation is correct, the Court 
could not have decided the case on the merits without first finding that 
all of the many defendant-intervenors had standing. Were even one of 
them to lack standing, the case would not be justiciable. That 
McConnell was decided on the merits, therefore, casts substantial 
doubt on the proposition that “an Article III case or controversy, once 
joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an 
Article III case or controversy.”127  
The Court’s dictum in Diamond and its ruling in McConnell 
strongly suggest that Rule 24 intervenors need not have Article III 
standing. At the very least, these decisions critically undermine the 
hard-line position taken by the Eighth Circuit in Mausolf. More 
 
 123. Id. at 233.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (rejecting “hypothetical 
jurisdiction” because “it carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and 
thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers”); Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (1984) (noting that the Supreme Court has “an 
obligation to assure [itself] that [plaintiffs have] Article III standing at the outset of the 
litigation”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (declining to issue a writ of 
mandamus because the applicable statute could not confer original jurisdiction).  
 127. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996). Minority circuits have not 
addressed the discrepancy between their position and the Supreme Court’s one-plaintiff rule 
whereby the Supreme Court proceeds to the merits of a case without determining that all plaintiffs 
have standing. For an analysis of the one-plaintiff rule and its use by federal courts, see generally 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 
2017). 
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broadly, these decisions call into question the validity of applying 
Article III to Rule 24 intervenors at all. If the inclusion of an intervenor 
without standing does not destroy Article III jurisdiction, and if Article 
III is a jurisdictional limitation rather than a filtering mechanism, it is 
unclear how one could justify excluding intervenors without appealing 
to prudential concerns alone. Ultimately, if only prudential concerns 
justify application of Article III to intervenors, the minority position is 
all the more dubious after Lexmark.  
II.  RULE 24 AND THE TWO PROCESS CONCERNS OF STARE DECISIS 
As Part I demonstrates, there is no conclusive answer to the 
question of whether Rule 24 requires that intervenors demonstrate 
Article III standing. Given this stalemate, the rest of this Note argues 
that two considerations—due process and the process of judicial 
decisionmaking—cut in favor of allowing parties to intervene without 
demonstrating standing. Because stare decisis requires courts to follow 
precedent, it is important that cases be decided correctly—that is, by 
taking into account the manifold ways a decision will affect future 
litigants—in the first instance. 
A. The Scope of Strength of Stare Decisis  
It was once a widely held view that “judicial opinions were of little 
import.”128 Principles of vertical and horizontal stare decisis required 
courts to follow the holdings of their superior (and sometimes 
coordinate) courts, but the opinions were virtually without force.129 
This argument still has its proponents, and there are a number of ways 
in which this position is formally correct.130 But as anyone who has 
written a case brief can attest, those in the legal field—particularly 
attorneys—place substantial importance on the rationales of legal 
decisions, not just their holdings. This attention to legal opinions, as 
opposed to holdings alone, is well founded as courts often treat their 
opinions as if they set general rules for society that affect parties 
beyond the scope of the instant case.131 That this occurs is not exactly a 
 
 128. Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 974 (2009).  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 975 & n.45.  
 131. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and 
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5–8 (1984) (“Today cases often are just excuses for 
the creation or alteration of [societal] rules.”).  
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secret.132 Though the precedential weight we give to opinions reflects a 
fairness-driven preference for “treating like cases alike,”133 it is also a 
functional requirement of our system. As the Ninth Circuit put it:  
The Supreme Court cannot limit its constitutional adjudication to the 
narrow facts before it in a particular case. In the decision of individual 
cases the Court must and regularly does establish guidelines to govern 
a variety of situations related to that presented in the immediate case. 
The system could not function if lower courts were free to disregard 
such guidelines whenever they did not precisely match the facts of the 
case in which the guidelines were announced.134 
It is thus not surprising that people at all levels of the legal profession—
students, professors, lawyers, and judges—pay close attention to 
judicial opinions.  
What is perhaps surprising is the preclusive effect courts give to 
opinions. It would be one thing if, as the Ninth Circuit describes, the 
broad reach of judicial opinions established flexible “guidelines” 
judges could apply with some discretion. In practice, however, judicial 
opinions are more binding than guiding. Once a judicial opinion is 
issued by an appellate court on a given matter of law, that 
interpretation will, absent extraordinary circumstances,135 govern 
future cases within the same jurisdiction regardless of the arguments 
future parties may advance against it.136 Horizontal stare decisis, which 
requires courts to follow their coordinate courts’ decisions, functions 
primarily at the appellate level137 where doctrinal rules require judges 
 
 132. See, e.g., Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of 
our prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules of law.”); Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“While 
individual cases turn upon the controversies between parties, or involve particular prosecutions, 
court rulings impose official and practical consequences upon members of society at large.”).  
 133. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
624 (1958).  
 134. United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 135. For a discussion of stare decisis and the grounds on which federal courts may overrule 
precedent, see infra notes 139–154 and accompanying text. 
 136. The exception to this rule is Rule 11, which allows a party to make “a nonfrivolous 
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). For reasons discussed below, there is substantial risk in making this type of 
Rule 11 argument. For an explanation of the circumstances under which Rule 11 sanctions are 
levied, see infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 137. Horizontal stare decisis is significantly less important at the district level, and sometimes 
completely unimportant. Courts in at most one district are required to follow intra-circuit 
precedent. See Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 843 (S. D. Ohio 2010) (“In the absence of 
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to follow the decision of a previous panel unless a subsequent en banc 
or Supreme Court decision overrules it.138 For example, if the Ninth 
Circuit holds in Litigant A’s case that “no vehicles in the park” means 
literally no vehicles, Litigant B effectively cannot argue that the rule 
should apply only to certain types of vehicles. Horizontal stare decisis 
prevents any panel within the circuit from ruling contrary to a previous 
panel’s decision. Litigant B’s only recourse is to obtain en banc or 
Supreme Court review. But mere error correction is almost certainly 
not going to get him there. En banc review is granted only when a case 
presents a “question of exceptional importance” or one on which 
panels within the circuit have disagreed.139 Similarly, the Supreme 
Court grants petitions for certiorari only when a case presents an issue 
of national importance or is one on which the circuit courts have split.140 
As a result, “[f]irst-in-time litigants usually receive the only 
opportunity to air arguments on the merits of a legal issue.”141 
Assume, perhaps, that the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court is 
eager to revisit the interpretation of “no vehicles in the park,” and so 
agrees to hear Litigant B’s case. Even in this improbable scenario, stare 
decisis further prevents courts from overruling themselves absent 
special circumstances. As the Supreme Court explained in Planned 
 
supervening case authority from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, this Court is bound, 
under the doctrine of stare decisis, to follow decisions of its own judges.”). But see Michael R. 
Mertz, Comment to Eugene Volokh, District Court Opinions Precedential Within the Same 
District?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 25, 2010, 8:33 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/05/25/district-
court-opinions-precedential-within-the-same-district [https://perma.cc/FN8S-AJ49] (providing 
comment of Magistrate Judge Michael Merz, author of the opinion in Kerr v. Hurd, 
acknowledging that “[t]he comments [on the Volokh Conspiracy] persuade me the quoted 
statement from my opinion is wrong”). In other jurisdictions, there is a presumption in favor of 
following intra-district precedent. See United States v. Hirschorn, 21 F.2d 758, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 
1927) (explaining that “the general rule [is] that a matter which is decided by any District Judge 
in this district should be, as a matter of comity, without re-examination by another judge, so 
decided”). In general, “federal district court decisions are treated like unpublished appellate 
decisions: they may be disregarded in future cases except for the purposes of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel.” Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial 
Power to “Unpublish” Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 168 (2001).  
 138. See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1018 
n.20 (2003) (noting that every circuit follows the rule that one panel cannot override another).  
 139. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); see also EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516, 529 (7th Cir. 
2001) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring) (“We take cases en banc . . . not just to review a panel 
opinion for error . . . .”). The rule that no panel can overrule another is not grounded in statute 
and is sometimes ignored. See generally Phillip M. Kannan, The Precedential Force of Panel Law, 
76 MARQUETTE L. REV. 755 (1993) (analyzing the origins and application of the interpanel rule). 
 140. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 141. Barrett, supra note 138, at 1017.  
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Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,142 the presumption 
of stare decisis in the federal judiciary143 is so strong that precedent 
cannot be overruled unless a series of factors weighs against it. To be 
overruled, precedent should be “unworkable”144 and should be 
discredited by subsequent factual145 and legal146 developments. It 
should also not have engendered “reliance,”147—in a more general than 
legal sense148—and the overruling should not appear to be so 
ideologically motivated as to tarnish the court’s reputation.149 The 
Court in Casey identified only two precedents, Lochner v. New York150 
and Plessy v. Ferguson,151 that ticked all of the boxes.152 To be clear, 
precedents have been overruled even when they have not met one or 
more of the conditions enumerated in Casey,153 but there is a strong 
presumption in federal courts against overruling precedent.154 
 
 142. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 143. Barrett, supra note 138, at 1018–19 (noting that “[n]either the Supreme Court nor any of 
the courts of appeals will overrule precedent absent ‘special justification,’” which includes an 
examination of the Casey factors).  
 144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.  
 145. Id. at 860.  
 146. Id. at 857.  
 147. Id. at 855–56.  
 148. As one commentator has explained:  
While many people may have strong ideological or personal stakes in the [legality of 
abortion] being decided one way or another, there is relatively little “reliance” in the 
sense of the existing rule having tended to create its own reliance—having caused 
people to “sink costs,” so to speak. There is, for example, less investment-backed social 
expectation in a particular legal regime concerning abortion than there was for 
continuation of “separate but equal” under Plessy v. Ferguson. 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the 
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1554–55 (2000).  
 149. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861, 865–66.  
 150. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
 151. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
 152. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–63. 
 153. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007) 
(noting that “[r]eliance interests do not require us to reaffirm [an incorrect precedent]”); Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 558 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the majority for overruling what “[l]ess than three years ago . . . in [a] unanimous decision” had 
been considered “settled constitutional doctrine”).  
 154. This presumption is even stronger in certain contexts. For example, when a court 
interprets a federal statute and Congress fails to amend it, the lack of amendment is seen as 
approval of the court’s interpretation. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) 
(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, 
unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and 
Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989))).  
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B. Stare Decisis’s Process Problems  
The strength of stare decisis in the federal judiciary implicates two 
separate processes. The first is procedural due process, which is 
undermined by stare decisis as practiced in the federal judiciary. The 
second is the judicial decisionmaking process, which is complicated by 
the epistemic constraints of case-based rulemaking and the adversarial 
presentation of evidence in our legal system. These two process 
concerns are considered below in turn. 
1. Due Process.  The Constitution twice guarantees that the 
government will not deprive anyone of “life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.”155 In the context of judicial proceedings 
and other types of individualized adjudications, due process includes 
the right to be heard on the merit of one’s claims and defenses.156 By 
effectively foreclosing the litigation of certain issues decided in 
previous cases, stare decisis is in tension with this right: in a significant 
sense, stare decisis limits the ability to be heard in anything more than 
a literal sense on one’s claims and defenses. For instance, a defendant 
who wants to argue that the employees of her riverboat casino are not 
“seamen” for the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act is 
effectively barred in the Seventh Circuit from doing so, whether or not 
her arguments were heard in the precedent-setting case or the case was 
even decidedly correctly.157 
Federal courts have rarely addressed the tension between stare 
decisis and due process. When they have, their reasoning has been 
more obscuring than illuminating. In Colby v. J.C. Penney Co.,158 the 
Seventh Circuit reversed a district judge for treating the precedent of 
another district court as outcome determinative in a sex discrimination 
suit.159 Because “the parties to cases before us are entitled to [the 
judge’s] independent judgment,” the district court erred by treating the 
precedent as binding rather than persuasive.160 Similarly, in Northwest 
 
 155. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 156. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 n.4 (1996) (“The opportunity to be 
heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings.”).  
 157. See Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 431 F.3d 580, 582–83 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The 
doctrine of stare decisis ‘imparts authority to a decision, depending on the court that rendered it, 
merely by virtue of the authority of the rendering court and independently of the quality of its 
reasoning.’” (quoting Midlock v. Apple Vacations W., Inc., 406 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2005))).  
 158. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 159. Id. at 1128.  
 160. Id. at 1123. 
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Forest Resource Council v. Dombeck,161 the D.C. Circuit reversed its 
district court for treating out-of-circuit district court precedent as 
binding in a challenge to an environmental plan.162 Because the district 
court was not compelled to follow another circuit, the district court had 
“deprive[d] appellants of their right to be heard on the merits of their 
claims.”163 Although these decisions pay some attention to the 
preclusive effects of stare decisis, it is unclear what they stand for. As 
one commentator has noted, “Dombeck and Colby raise more 
questions than they answer.”164 Both the Seventh and D.C. Circuits in 
these cases flagged the potential due process concerns underlying the 
issue-preclusive effects of stare decisis. By highlighting the nonbinding 
nature of other-circuit and other-district precedent, however, the 
courts imply that analogous precedent from an appropriate source 
would not present the same due process concern.165 The salience of this 
distinction is less than clear. Precluding consideration of certain issues 
because of stare decisis burdens the right to be heard regardless of the 
precedent’s source; whatever the precedent’s pedigree, the instant 
litigant is effectively precluded by the resolution of someone else’s case 
from making a claim in hers. 
This blind spot likely owes to the traditional understanding of 
stare decisis.166 In the common law, stare decisis was considered a 
doctrine that applied to judges rather than parties. In justifying the life 
tenure of federal judges, Alexander Hamilton explained:  
To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that 
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve 
to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes 
before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of 
controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, 
that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very 
considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to 
acquire a competent knowledge of them.167 
 
 161. Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 162. Id. at 901.  
 163. Id. at 898.  
 164. Barrett, supra note 138, at 1027. 
 165. Id.  
 166. See id. at 1031 (“To the extent that the traditional account [of stare decisis] has focused 
on precedent’s binding effect, it has focused on judges.”).  
 167. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 2001) (emphasis 
added).  
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In a similar but more recent vein, the Federal Circuit has described 
stare decisis as “a doctrine that binds courts” but “does not bind 
parties.”168 Though that might be true in a formal sense, stare decisis 
inevitably affects future parties by binding judges to follow prior 
decisions: a judge who is commanded by stare decisis to follow a 
previous court’s interpretation of “all vehicles” is a judge whose 
litigants effectively cannot contest that interpretation.  
The judicial treatment of stare decisis is even more questionable 
when one compares it to the doctrine of issue preclusion.169 Like stare 
decisis, issue preclusion promotes judicial efficiency and consistency by 
binding litigants to prior judgments of the same issue.170 Unlike stare 
decisis, however, issue preclusion bars a party from litigating a certain 
issue only if the party had a “full and fair opportunity”171 to do so 
previously. In contemporary doctrine, parties can be precluded from 
litigating an issue only if they were a party in previous litigation in 
which the issue was resolved, or if they were in privity with such a party. 
The doctrinal treatment of stare decisis, on the other hand, evinces no 
such concern for due process. Stare decisis assumes a prior resolution 
of a particular issue binds future parties, even if those parties had no 
hand in the precedent-setting litigation and thus had no opportunity to 
be heard.172 
The traditional explanation for why issue preclusion and stare 
decisis treat parties differently is the putative flexibility of stare 
decisis.173 Issue preclusion is rigid—once an issue is settled, it is settled 
 
 168. Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373–
74 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 169. See Barrett, supra note 138, at 1032–43 (comparing the judicial treatment of stare decisis 
to that of res judicata). 
 170. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329–30 (1979) (explaining that defensive 
issue preclusion is meant to deny litigants the ability to relitigate issues by “merely ‘switching 
adversaries’” (quoting Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813 
(1942))).  
 171. Id. at 328.  
 172. See Bethesda Lutheran Homes & Servs., Inc. v. Born, 238 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(“[S]tare decisis . . . bars a different party from obtaining the overruling of a decision. The 
existence of different parties is assumed by the doctrine, rather than being something that takes 
a case outside its reach.”).  
 173. See id. (“Of course, stare decisis is a less rigid doctrine than res judicata. But it is not a 
noodle.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“When 
the issue involved is one of law, stability of decision can be regulated by the rule of issue preclusion 
or by the more flexible rule of stare decisis.”); Barrett, supra note 138, at 1043–47 (suggesting “the 
supposed flexibility of stare decisis” as the reason “the doctrines [of issue preclusion and stare 
decisis] treat nonparties differently”).  
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for the purposes of all litigation involving the same parties or privies. 
Stare decisis, on the other hand, is considered to be more flexible 
inasmuch as parties can distinguish their cases from precedent, appeal 
an unfavorable decision, or make nonfrivolous arguments that a 
precedent should be overruled. As intuitive as this seems, the 
distinction is greater in theory than in practice. There is a limit on the 
ability of courts to distinguish one case from another.174 And the ability 
to distinguish does not make stare decisis any more flexible: the act of 
distinguishing a case is one of arguing why the instant facts are 
materially different from those of a precedential case. The act of 
distinguishing assumes stare decisis binds but argues that the instant 
case is not within the scope of the binding precedent.  
At the appellate level, the ability to appeal turns entirely on the 
authority of the precedent—for example, appealing a district versus 
appellate court decision—and whether the appealed issue is 
sufficiently important to merit (re-)consideration in the context of en 
banc and Supreme Court appeals.175 If the authority is sufficiently 
great, or the urged basis of appeal is mere error correction, one is 
unlikely to obtain review. Though Rule 11(b)(2) does allow one to 
make nonfrivolous arguments for the reversal of precedent,176 the same 
Rule 11 mandates sanctions for arguments that are not “reasonable,”177 
thereby deterring challenges to precedent. Moreover, because Rule 
11(b)(2) challenges ask judges to render a decision despite the weight 
of precedent, such challenges are often likely to fail. Consequently, an 
attorney facing pressure from clients to reduce litigation costs is likely 
to stay away from Rule 11 arguments that, even when well made, are 
unlikely to persuade. 
Under current doctrine, stare decisis and issue preclusion similarly 
preclude parties from relitigating issues once decided, yet due process 
limits only issue preclusion. But perhaps this is the wrong way to think 
 
 174. See Barrett, supra note 138, at 1021 (“A court’s capacity for ‘honest’ distinguishing . . . 
does somewhat blunt a case’s effect on later litigants. Court cannot, however, fairly distinguish 
every case.”). 
 175. For an examination of stare decisis in the federal judiciary, see supra Part II.A.  
 176. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (allowing parties to make “a nonfrivolous argument for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law”).  
 177. See Corroon v. Reeve, 258 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Rule 11 is violated when it is clear 
under existing precedents that a pleading has no chance of success and there is no reasonable 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse the law as it stands.”). But see McKnight v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 511 U.S. 659, 660 (1994) (per curiam) (providing that an argument is not frivolous if, though 
“foreclosed by Circuit precedent,” it concerns an issue that has “divided the District Courts and 
its answer [is] not so clear as to make [the] position frivolous”).  
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of it. Maybe the explanation for courts’ reluctance to apply due process 
to stare decisis has less to do with the effects of the two doctrines than 
with the relationship between precedent-setting courts and future 
litigants. As one commentator has noted, Colby and Dombeck could 
stand for the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees a full 
hearing on the merits of one’s arguments only in matters of first 
impression.178 Under this theory, a precedent-setting court would sit as 
adjudicator to the instant litigants, but would function like a legislative 
rulemaker as to future parties. Because legislatures and other 
rulemaking bodies are not required by due process to afford a hearing 
to potentially affected parties,179 why should courts do so when acting 
in this capacity? 
The Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence distinguishes 
between adjudicatory acts involving individualized deprivations of life, 
liberty, and property, and legislative enactments, which affect large 
groups of people.180 Whereas adjudication requires procedural 
safeguards, the Supreme Court made clear in Bi-Metallic Investment 
Co. v. State Board of Equalization181 that rights are protected from 
legislative deprivations by the political process.182 The distinction 
between adjudications and legislative enactments, however, does little 
to resolve the issue posed by judicial rulemakings, which are 
adjudications in some senses and rulemakings in others. Instead, we 
must look to the rationale behind the adjudication-rulemaking 
distinction. When a legislature passes a broadly applicable law, citizens’ 
“rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex 
society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the 
rule.”183 Because the electoral process affords enough protection 
against bad lawmaking, due process does not require the right to be 
heard. Such a requirement would make impossible the already difficult 
task of enacting legislation. But when a decision affects only a few 
people, electoral redress is less significant a check on bad or unfair 
 
 178. Barrett, supra note 138, at 1053. 
 179. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (explaining 
that due process does not require individual hearings for those affected by generally applicable 
statutes).  
 180. Compare id., with Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (explaining that 
individualized tax assessments for local improvements are adjudicatory and require notice and 
the opportunity to be heard).  
 181. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
 182. Id. at 445 (explaining that people are protected from legislative deprivations “by their 
power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule”).  
 183. Id.  
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decisionmaking. In such cases, due process requires the opportunity to 
be heard.184 On this account, the degree to which an affected group is 
entitled to a hearing is inversely related to the degree of electoral 
control the group can potentially exert on the rulemaker.  
Like generally applicable laws, precedents affect potentially very 
large groups of future litigants. Consequently, the sort of democratic 
coalition building Bi-Metallic contemplates as a means to correct an 
unpopular decision is possible. This, however, is where the story must 
end, for judicial opinions—though they may draw a broad and diverse 
crowd of opponents—are not readily subject to electoral change. 
Federal judges are, by design, rulemakers insulated from the electoral 
process.185 And, although there are some judicial interpretations that 
can be changed through the legislative process, the Cooper v. Aaron186 
principle of judicial supremacy limits this to judicial interpretations of 
nonconstitutional law.187 Absent from judicial precedent is the crucial 
ingredient—feasible political redressability188—that separates rules 
from adjudications in the context of due process. 
2. Judicial Decisionmaking.  The strength of stare decisis in the 
federal judiciary implicates another process: the decisionmaking 
process. The Constitution requires federal judicial rulemaking to take 
place in the context of concrete cases and controversies. This raises two 
concerns. First, the epistemic constraints of case-based decisionmaking 
inevitably lead judges to over- and underemphasize the importance of 
certain facts relative to the unknown facts of future cases that will come 
under the precedent’s rule. Second, because parties in a case are most 
immediately concerned with winning, they have an incentive not to 
present information that, although it might be useful in the 
determination of the broader rule, is either contrary or neutral to their 
position in the litigation.  
 
 184. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385–86.  
 185. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing life tenure of federal judges); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 167, at 405 (arguing that “permanent tenure” is necessary for 
judges to serve as “bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments”).  
 186. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  
 187. Id. at 18 (“No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against [the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution] without violating his undertaking to support it.”).  
 188. In a formal sense, disappointed parties have the ability to invalidate judicial 
interpretations of nonconstitutional, statutory law via the legislative process. But this ability is 
generally much more theoretical than it is practical. For an explanation of why the legislative 
process is often an inadequate means to overrule precedent, see infra Part III.B.3.  
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a. Bad Cases Make Bad Law, But So Can Good Ones.  Court-
issued legal rules are products of the common law method, which, for 
reasons discussed below, can be a sub-optimal decisionmaking process. 
To understand the durability of the common law method, one must 
first understand the historical context in which it became a facet of 
American law. Writing in 1870, Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked that 
“[i]t is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and 
determines the principle afterwards.”189 At the time, many still believed 
in the classical conception of law—that objectively correct legal 
answers could be deduced from universal principles of logic and 
morality.190 Holmes knew better,191 and the legal world is now generally 
disabused of the notion that positive law ultimately derives from 
transcendental principles of logic or morality.192 But the presumption 
that the resolution of cases makes for good law—the common law 
method, as Holmes described it—is still baked into our legal structure. 
The Case or Controversy Clause,193 from which the modern doctrine of 
standing derives,194 requires that judges limit their jurisdiction to actual 
cases lest their opinion be merely advisory, and therefore prohibited.195 
Though standing has been justified on a number of grounds, one of the 
most frequently invoked is the doctrine’s requirement that the plaintiff 
allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to 
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of 
 
 189. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1 
(1870), reprinted in 44 HARV. L. REV. 725, 725 (1931).  
 190. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 847 (1935) (rejecting the classical conception’s view of “judicial decisions” as “products 
of logical parthenogenesis born of pre-existing legal principles”).  
 191. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897) 
(rejecting the idea that the law is “a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or 
what not”).  
 192. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 883 (2006) 
(“[Holmes] fully appreciated that common law judges made law in the process of deciding cases, 
and nowadays few think otherwise. Common law method is not simply the discovery of immanent 
law, but rather an approach in which the decision of live disputes in concrete contexts guides the 
lawmaking function.”).  
 193. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
 194. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95–98 (1968) (explaining that “[s]tanding is an 
aspect of justiciability” and “[j]usticiability is the term of art employed to give expression to . . . 
the case-and-controversy doctrine”).  
 195. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 65–66 
(7th ed. 2011) (noting that the prohibition against advisory opinions has been termed “the oldest 
and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability”); Letter from Chief Justice Jay and 
Associate Justices to President Washington (July 20, 1793), in 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 487, 488–89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891). 
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issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of 
difficult constitutional questions[.]”196 If courts are confined to the 
information presented in the instant case, the rationale goes, that 
information should come from parties who are sufficiently motivated 
to make the best arguments.  
Despite the common law method’s undoubted advantages, there 
is reason to be skeptical. The common law method relies on the notion 
that judges will better resolve a given legal question if they have a live 
controversy before them. It is only with a live controversy, the 
argument goes, that judges can see how a given rule plays out in real 
life; it “sharpens the presentation of issues.”197 Were judges free to 
issue opinions absent a concrete case, they might fail to consider the 
unpredictable ways in which a given law is actually enforced.198 Still, a 
case-based rulemaker is put in an awkward position. She must 
simultaneously resolve the immediate case and use the case’s specific 
facts to determine a general rule to apply to similarly situated future 
parties. In determining the types of disputes that will fall under the 
rule, the facts of the immediate case create “a substantial risk that the 
common law rulemaker will be unduly influenced by the particular case 
before her.”199 This concern is less pressing if the immediate case is 
representative of future cases falling under the rule. But if the instant 
case is not representative of the class of cases that will fall under the 
future rule, the chance that a judge will place undue importance on the 
facts of the present case is high. Judges “make this (mis-)assessment 
[of representativeness] not on the basis of a rational survey of the class, 
and not on the basis of systematic empirical examination, but instead 
largely on the basis of the usually irrelevant factors of proximity or ease 
of recall.”200 This phenomenon, called the “availability heuristic,”201 is 
exacerbated by the phenomenon of “anchoring,”202 through which the 
characteristics of the first event (a precedent-setting case, for instance) 
 
 196. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).  
 197. Id. 
 198. Cf. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (explaining the doctrine of ripeness 
as a method to “prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements” over questions of law).  
 199. Schauer, supra note 192, at 894.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 790–92 (2001) (demonstrating a statistically significant influence of 
anchoring on judicial decisionmaking).  
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influence the estimation of subsequent events (hypothetical future 
parties to whom the precedent will apply, for example). Consequently, 
even a judge who is aware that future circumstances might differ from 
the present case—who, in other words, is aware of the availability 
heuristic’s influence—might be unable to escape the anchoring 
influence the present case has on her ability to assess the field of future 
disputes.203 
b. The Distortive Effect of Adversarial Information.  The problems 
inherent in case-based rulemaking are not merely issues of framing and 
anchoring. The information presented in litigation is not only 
sometimes inadequate, but biased by design. Because parties in the 
adversarial context are trying to win rather than reach the best legal or 
factual conclusion, they are motivated to present less-than-
comprehensive assessments of a given decision’s legal ramifications.204 
Even when litigants do not intentionally filter information in this 
fashion, the generalist nature of most lawyers and judges presents 
additional information-related concerns. Because generalist judges 
rely on the adversarial process to explain highly technical, specialized 
issues, process errors can occur when a given lawyer does not 
adequately understand the issue and, therefore, does not present the 
most relevant or reliable information.205 The resulting decision may 
accordingly be distorted.  
As the preceding Section argues, stare decisis poses two general 
process problems. The first concerns due process and, specifically, the 
preclusive effect stare decisis has on parties’ ability to fully present 
their claims. The second concerns the judicial decisionmaking process 
and, in particular, the distortive effects of case-based decisionmaking 
and adversarial information. Though perhaps an unlikely hero, Rule 
 
 203. Schauer, supra note 192, at 897. 
 204. See, e.g., William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor with No Clothes: The Supreme Court’s 
Tax Rules for Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1685, 1725 (1994) (noting that 
lawyers in tax cases tend to “focus[] on traditional [precedential] arguments” because they have 
“no incentive to offer fundamental analysis, a new approach, or a critique of the existing set of 
rules”).  
 205. See Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon’s Den: A Failure of Judicial 
Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1981). Wolfman explains:  
Hardly an enclave of tax experts, the Supreme Court relies for illumination and 
protection on the validity of a basic assumption of the adversary process: that strong 
and effective advocates bring the issues into focus and marshal the strongest arguments 
for each side, thus educating the Court and helping it reach the best result. 
Id.  
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24(a)(2)—unfettered by Article III standing—has the ability to greatly 
reduce the effect of these process problems.  
III.  INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY 
In light of the problems outlined in Part II, commentators have 
proposed a more flexible approach to stare decisis206 or a system of 
notice-and-comment judicial rulemaking.207 There is much to be said 
for these and other proposals, but they would require federal 
legislation, a reconception of stare decisis, or both. As luck would have 
it, a far more practical remedy already exists in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: Rule 24(a)(2).  
A. Rule 24(a)(2) and Stare Decisis’s Process Errors  
First, as discussed above at Part II.B, the preclusive effect of stare 
decisis can constrain a litigant’s ability to argue certain issues such that, 
in some cases, one’s right to a hearing seems like an empty formality. 
Rule 24 mitigates this effect by allowing parties who will potentially be 
subject to a given decision’s precedential effect to intervene and 
influence the result.208 For instance, imagine that a court is interpreting 
the government’s application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to a 
manufacturer (Graft Foods) and a retailer (Fraud Meyer) who entered 
into a vertical agreement to fix a minimum resale price for a certain 
macaroni product. The Sherman Antitrust Act’s text empowers the 
government to prohibit “[e]very contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy[] in restraint of trade,”209 and asks that federal courts 
determine the types of behavior that fall under the Act’s prohibition.210 
Vertical price restraints can be seen as a practice that inhibits211 or 
 
 206. See Barrett, supra note 138, at 1060–61 (“Without flexibility, stare decisis functions as a 
doctrine of preclusion, and its application to nonparty litigants poses the same due process 
problem as the application of issue preclusion to nonparty litigants.”). 
 207. See Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 128, at 967–68 (arguing that “[a]lthough it would 
represent a significant change,” it seems “the case for notice-and-comment judicial 
decisionmaking is in most respects at least as strong as the case for notice-and-comment 
administrative rulemaking”).  
 208. For cases in which courts have recognized adverse stare decisis effect as a cognizable 
interest under Rule 24(a)(2), see supra note 47.  
 209. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 210. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“The legislative 
history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the [Sherman 
Act’s] broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”).  
 211. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 384–85 (1911) (banning 
vertical price restraints because they are anticompetitive).  
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sometimes promotes212 trade depending on the context, so the case 
could go either way. That is, the court could create a per se rule against 
vertical price restraints or create a more flexible standard that permits 
them when they are effectively procompetitive. Many industries 
comprising many parties will be affected by this ruling; vertical price 
restraints are not exactly a niche practice.213 In this scenario, a 
straightforward application of Rule 24(a)(2) would entitle other 
companies to defend their interests by participating in the litigation. 
These parties, much like the intervenors in Grutter v. Bollinger,214 
might very well make arguments that Graft Foods and Fraud Meyer 
have incentives not to make.215 Or perhaps vertical price restraints are 
not as important in the macaroni industry as they are in other sectors. 
Were this the case, Graft Foods might not argue the case as vigorously 
as would a company more significantly affected by a potentially 
adverse precedent. Requiring Article III standing would likely 
preclude many of these intervenors from defending their interests. 
Unlike under Rule 24(a)(2), an adverse stare decisis effect does not 
count among the injuries that satisfy Article III standing.216 A party 
alleging stare decisis harm can intervene only if Article III does not 
apply to Rule 24(a)(2).  
It is important to note that Rule 24(a)(2) intervention can protect 
the interests of future litigants even when they themselves do not 
intervene. The greater the number of parties in the precedent-setting 
litigation, the greater the chance that one of the parties will anticipate 
the interests of future litigants. For instance, in the example above, if 
Shady Records, Inc. is allowed to intervene in the Graft Foods 
litigation, the interests of future music publishers will, in theory, be 
 
 212. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877, 906–07 (2007) 
(overruling Dr. Miles’s per se ban on vertical price agreements because they can be efficient).  
 213. For instance, Apple, Inc. was recently required to pay a $450 million settlement in a 
price-fixing scheme involving e-book publishers selling on the iTunes platform. See Brian X. Chen 
& Nicole Perlroth, Settlement in Apple Case Over E-Books is Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 
2014), https://nyti.ms/2ts2V7Q [https://perma.cc/3VQG-LJMY]. 
 214. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 215. For a description of the intervenors, see supra note 19.  
 216. Such an injury would likely not be the “concrete,” “distinct and palpable,” or “actual and 
imminent” injury required by standing. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003), overruled on 
other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. 
Co. v. FDIC, 717 F.3d 189, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring) (arguing for 
application of Article III standing to intervenors as a means to avoid intervention by parties with 
“a concern with a possible unfavorable precedent”); 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 83, 
§ 3531.4, at 138–295 (noting no decision in which adverse stare decisis effect was a sufficient injury 
to confer standing). 
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protected better than if Shady Records were excluded. Though this is 
no substitute for the right to be heard on one’s own claims, this sort of 
virtual representation at least softens stare decisis’s blow.  
Similarly, Rule 24(a)(2) potentially ameliorates the rule-distorting 
effects of case-based adjudication, as discussed above in Part II.B.2. 
Although judges may still be influenced by the availability heuristic, 
the ability of other affected parties to intervene decreases the odds that 
the availability heuristic will lead judges to misconstrue the class of 
litigants to whom the rule will apply. In other words, as the number of 
parties increases, so too does the degree to which the instant parties 
represent the class of people who will later be affected by the decision’s 
precedent. The effect of anchoring is similarly mitigated insofar as the 
characteristics by which judges assess the possible class of future 
litigants will be more representative of the class of people affected by 
the decision. And, lest judges be concerned that intervening parties will 
hijack the litigation, Rule 24(a)(2) allows judges the ability to limit the 
intervening parties’ activities.217 
The benefits of allowing intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) without 
requiring Article III standing are even clearer when one considers how 
stare decisis affects the federal judiciary’s legitimacy. The rest of this 
Note considers this relationship and evaluates the alternatives 
available to would-be intervenors. 
1. Rule 24(a)(2) and Legitimacy.  Rule 24(a)(2)’s enhancement of 
the rulemaking process implicates a related judicial value: legitimacy. 
As Alexander Hamilton recognized in Federalist No. 78, the federal 
judiciary has “no influence over . . . the sword or the purse.”218 
Consequently, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the federal 
judiciary’s “power lies . . . in its legitimacy.”219 The public’s perception 
of the judiciary’s legitimacy is determined by a number of factors, 
foremost among them the degree to which a court’s decisions and 
procedures comport with the public understanding of procedural 
justice.220 Whether members of the general public consider a given legal 
decision procedurally just turns in large part on whether they feel they 
“have an opportunity to state their case to legal authorities” or 
 
 217. For a discussion of courts’ authority to limit intervenors’ activity, see supra notes 112–
113 and accompanying text. 
 218. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 167, at 402.  
 219. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
 220. Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of 
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 663 (2007).  
FERGUSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2017  12:13 PM 
2017] RULE 24 NOTWITHSTANDING 225 
otherwise “have a ‘voice’ in the decision-making process.”221 When a 
court renders a legal decision on the basis of arguments or facts never 
presented by the instant parties—in other words, when a court applies 
precedent—it loses legitimacy in the eyes of the instant parties insofar 
as they feel denied the right to be heard.222  
Though again not a perfect remedy, Rule 24(a)(2) allows parties 
who will be affected by a given precedent to intervene and defend their 
interest. Rule 24 gives these parties the right to be heard where they 
otherwise would not be. In addition, to the extent that Rule 24 
encourages potentially affected parties to intervene, interests akin to 
those of all potential future parties—whether or not they personally 
had the opportunity to intervene—are more likely to have been 
represented when the precedent was set. Moreover, by increasing the 
court’s exposure to different sources and greater volumes of 
information, Rule 24 also helps ensure the court’s decision was not 
made on the basis of faulty, misrepresentative, or inadequate data. The 
greater likelihood that a court’s decision is based on all of the relevant 
data, in turn, increases the public’s confidence in the decision’s fairness, 
and thus the court’s legitimacy. And the sounder the decision, the less 
likely it is to be overruled, which similarly increases the court’s 
legitimacy.223 
B. The Inadequacy of Alternative Remedies  
The argument for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention uninhibited by 
Article III standing would be considerably less powerful if existing 
procedural remedies adequately accommodated the needs of third 
parties and the decisionmaking process. When one considers Rule 24’s 
alternatives, however, the case for intervention of right becomes even 
clearer.  
 
 221. Id. at 664.  
 222. Against this argument is the standard account of stare decisis as a guardian of a court’s 
legitimacy. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 866 (“The legitimacy of the Court . . . fade[s] with the 
frequency of its vacillation.”). But these arguments—one for representation and the other for 
stare decisis—are not mutually exclusive. The best way to accommodate both interests might be 
to allow interested parties to intervene in a case so that the resulting precedent better 
accommodates the interests of future parties it binds. 
 223. See id. (arguing that frequent judicial inconsistency is perceived as “evidence that 
justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular results in the short 
term”).  
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1. The Amicus Curiae Brief.  Rule 24 intervention only operates at 
the trial level.224 A party permitted to intervene at the trial level will 
continue to be treated as an original party through the course of any 
appeal,225 but a party cannot intervene at the appellate level. By 
contrast, parties interested in the resolution of an appellate case who 
were not part of the original litigation can submit an amicus curiae 
brief.226 Because amicus briefs do not require the same degree of 
involvement at the trial stage but nevertheless can play a role at the 
appellate level—where substantive precedential law is made—a 
reasonable case can be made that amicus briefs are a preferable 
alternative to intervention from the perspective of a would-be 
intervenor. And federal judges would almost certainly prefer to deal 
with multiple amici than multiple parties on each side of the litigation.  
But the ease of filing an amicus brief is, in part, its undoing. Parties 
are not entitled to file amicus briefs at will, but instead may do so only 
when the court or both parties consent.227 Getting consent to file an 
amicus brief only gets you so far. District and appellate courts rarely 
cite amici, and many judges consider them to be an improper addition 
to the record.228 Others, such as Judge Posner, view amicus briefs as 
inefficient and suspect that they are intended as “an end run around 
court-imposed limitations on the length of parties’ briefs.”229 
Sometimes it is not clear that judges read amicus briefs at all. For 
instance, after his dissent in Frank v. Walker, Judge Posner defended 
his seeming reversal of his position from Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board on the grounds that Crawford was written before he 
 
 224. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only govern federal district courts. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United 
States district courts . . . .”). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not have an 
intervention rule analogous to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 225. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (“Had the State sought review . . . 
Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also would be entitled to seek review, enabling him 
to file a brief on the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally.”).  
 226. See FED. R. APP. P. 29. 
 227. See FED. R. APP. P. 29(a)(2) (“Any other amicus curiae [than those filed by the 
government] may file a brief only by leave of court or if the brief states that all parties have 
consented to its filing.”). 
 228. Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine 
Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 686, 695 (2008).  
 229. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003). But see Justice 
Breyer Calls for Experts To Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A17 
(“[Amicus] briefs play an important role in educating judges on potentially relevant technical 
matters, helping to make us not experts but educated lay persons and thereby helping to improve 
the quality of our decisions.”). 
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knew the true nature of voter identification laws.230 Specifically, Judge 
Posner had not yet realized that, given no actual evidence of voter-
impersonation fraud, voter identification laws were “a mere fig leaf for 
efforts to disenfranchise voters likely to vote for the political party that 
does not control the state government,”231 as he would later put it in 
Frank v. Walker. But Judge Posner must not have done his homework: 
the Brennan Center for Justice filed an amicus brief in the 2007 
Crawford litigation that demonstrated, among other things, that “there 
is no evidence of impersonation fraud in Indiana,”232 that “not a single 
Indiana resident has ever been indicted for impersonation fraud,”233 
and that the study the district court relied on to uphold the voter 
identification law itself recognized that “wrongful disenfranchisement 
of voters is a ‘far bigger problem’ than voter fraud.”234 A person who 
files an amicus brief, it would seem, is a person who runs a substantial 
risk of being ignored. 
Perhaps the likelihood of being ignored is actually a merit of the 
amicus brief. Judges too often rely on dubious amicus facts without 
independently confirming their accuracy. For instance, in Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co.,235 the Supreme Court had to determine whether 
the Constitution was violated when a state judge failed to recuse 
himself in a case involving a party who had spent $3 million on the 
judge’s reelection campaign.236 Dissenting from the majority, Chief 
Justice John Roberts argued that the contribution did not violate due 
process, citing an amicus brief for numerous “examples of judicial 
elections in which independent expenditures backfired and hurt the 
candidate’s campaign.”237 The amicus brief cited a law review article, 
which itself had cited an email from a state judge that was “‘on file with’ 
the authors.”238 Similarly, in Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders,239 many of the factual claims referenced in the majority 
 
 230. See Posner, supra note 14. 
 231. Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting).  
 232. Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 2, Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-2218, 
06-2317).  
 233. Id. at 7–8. 
 234. Id. at 9. 
 235. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 566 U.S. 868 (2009) 
 236. Id. at 872.  
 237. Id. at 901 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 238. Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1785 (2014).  
 239. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).  
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opinion and cited to in an amicus brief were not actually supported by 
any authority in the brief.240 Frighteningly, these cases are not rare, 
isolated incidents.241 
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention shares none of these disadvantages. 
First, Rule 24(a)(2) enables intervention of right, which, at least in 
theory, is a right a judge cannot discretionarily deny if the intervenor 
satisfies Rule 24(a)(2)’s conditions. Second, because the information 
presented at trial by intervenors is the record, judges are considerably 
more likely to take intervenors’ arguments and data seriously. As an 
upshot of being taken seriously, intervenors’ arguments and data are 
more likely to be cross-examined by opposing counsel. Consequently, 
dubious data, of the sort sometimes found in amicus briefs, are less 
likely to enter the judicial decisionmaking calculus. In the status quo, 
by contrast, the perception of amicus briefs as unimportant serves as a 
disincentive to contest their facts. Even if a lawyer is inclined to contest 
opposing counsel’s amicus facts, the sheer volume of amicus briefs at 
some levels of litigation makes this task nearly impossible.242 
Intervention also offers tactical advantages amicus briefs cannot. For 
instance, parties intervening at the trial level have the ability, just like 
an original party, to preserve certain issues for appellate review.243 
Amicus briefs, on the other hand, can only respond to issues preserved 
by the parties on appeal.244 Thus, parties who seek to shape the 
contours of a given judicial rule should prefer intervention to 
participation as an amicus.  
2. Permissive Intervention under Rule 24(b).  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(b) enables judges to grant intervention permissively 
rather than of right. The requirements imposed by Rule 24(b) are 
significantly less demanding than those in Rule 24(a)(2). In contrast to 
Rule 24(a)(2)’s tripartite requirement, Rule 24(b) asks only whether 
 
 240. Larsen, supra note 238, at 1785.  
 241. See id. at 1757–1800 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court has relied on dubious 
amicus facts).  
 242. See id., at 1764 (“The number of amicus briefs filed [in the Supreme Court] and the 
amount of seemingly legitimate information available to present makes it very unlikely that a 
litigant can adequately respond to amici-presented factual claims.”).  
 243. This is an upshot of intervenors’ presumptive status as full parties to the litigation. See 
supra note 108 and accompanying text. Critically, however, an intervenor cannot actually appeal 
unless she has Article III standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63 (1986) (noting that 
“status as a ‘party’ does not equate with status as an appellant”).  
 244. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) 
(“There is no dispute that an amicus curiae may not raise new issues on appeal.”). 
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the applicant has a “conditional right to intervene by a federal 
statute”245 or “a claim or defense that shares with the main action a 
common question of law or fact.”246 Unlike Rule 24(a)(2), however, 
Rule 24(b) does not grant a right. Apart from the requirement that the 
intervenor share a claim of law or fact, the action under Rule 24(b) is 
entirely at the judge’s discretion.247 It is unlikely that a court that 
applies Article III standing to Rule 24(a)(2) intervention for prudential 
reasons would open suits up to Rule 24(b) intervenors.248  
Furthermore, the arguments for applying Article III standing to 
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention of right apply equally to permissive Rule 
24(b) intervention. A permissive intervenor is just as much “on an 
equal footing”249 as a Rule 24(a)(2) intervenor, and would similarly 
destroy Article III jurisdiction according to the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning.250 Because a Rule 24(b) intervenor presumably has a less 
significant interest in the litigation than a Rule 24(a)(2) intervenor—
otherwise they would have attempted to intervene under Rule 
24(a)(2)251—Rule 24(b) intervenors are also more likely to turn courts 
into “judicial versions of college debating forums.”252 Accordingly, 
circuits using Article III standing as a prudential barrier would 
presumably be less likely to allow intervention under Rule 24(b) than 
under Rule 24(a)(2).  
3. The Democratic Process.  The Supreme Court’s standing cases 
make clear that the constitutionally preferred method of redressing 
 
 245. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(A).  
 246. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B).  
 247. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1902, at 261 (“An application for permissive 
intervention is addressed to the discretion of the court, whereas an application for intervention of 
right seems to pose only a question of law.”). 
 248. But see Flynt v. Lombardi, 782 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2015) (allowing an intervenor 
without standing under Rule 24(b) because he only sought to unseal legal documents).  
 249. City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 250. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n Article III case or 
controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an Article 
III case or controversy.”). But see Flynt, 782 F.3d at 967 (allowing an intervenor who did not have 
standing).  
 251. In reality, Rule 24(b) is used by litigants as a fallback to Rule 24(a)(2). See 7C WRIGHT 
& MILLER, supra note 31, § 1902, at 262 (“Applicants often will rely alternatively on both 
subdivision (a) and subdivision (b) and courts sometimes hold that intervention will be allowed 
without specifying which branch of the rule is on point.”).  
 252. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1301 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for 
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)). 
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generalized grievances is the electoral process.253 This approach makes 
sense for the majority of generally applicable legislative rules. But as it 
concerns generally applicable judicial rules, democratic redressability 
is an implausible remedy. Legislative gridlock precludes many a 
statutory amendment at the federal level,254 even if this might not be as 
significant a concern at the state level.255 Parties who overcome the 
substantial obstacle of gridlock may yet meet an insuperable one: 
according to the judicial supremacy principle articulated in Cooper v. 
Aaron, federal courts’ interpretation of the Constitution is the 
Constitution, and therefore not subject to legislative or executive 
second-guessing.256 In many cases, either for political or constitutional 
reasons, the political process will not afford an effective remedy to a 
party wishing to change precedent.  
Considering the alternatives to Rule 24(a)(2)—that is, the amicus 
brief, Rule 24(b), and the democratic process—intervention of right is 
likely the most plausible way to mitigate the process errors of stare 
decisis. Rule 24(a)(2) can only play this role, however, if parties who 
seek to use it are not required to demonstrate independent Article III 
standing. 
CONCLUSION  
Stare decisis requires that decisions issued by federal courts be 
followed by litigants further down the pike. Whether this is a merit or 
fault of our judicial system is an open question. There is certainly value, 
for courts and society more generally, in a system of stare decisis that 
“promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development 
of legal principles.”257 It is hard to imagine how society could function 
 
 253. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975) (“[C]itizens dissatisfied with 
provisions of [generally applicable laws] need not overlook the availability of the normal 
democratic process.”).  
 254. See SARAH BINDER, POLARIZED WE GOVERN? (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/BrookingsCEPM_Polarized_figReplacedTextRevTableRev.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZGL2-WREZ] (noting, among other things, that the 2011–2012 Congress was 
the most gridlocked in the postwar era).  
 255. See 2016 State & Legislative Partisan Composition (Pre-Election), NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections
/Legis_Control_2016_Nov7.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQM9-WBQM] (showing that the majority of 
state governments are not divided).  
 256. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“No state legislator or executive or judicial 
officer can war against [the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution] without violating 
his undertaking to support it.”). 
 257. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).  
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otherwise: the rule of law could hardly take root in an amnesic 
judiciary, in which courts would be free to determine legal principles 
afresh in some Kafkaesque judicial version of Groundhog Day.258 But 
the impulse to “treat[] like cases alike”259 should not lead us to ignore 
two other important judicial values: accuracy and fairness. Stare decisis 
promotes the values of consistency, efficiency, and fairness it was 
designed to advance. At the same time, it has the potential to force 
reliance on suboptimal precedent and to deny parties the ability to be 
heard to the same extent as those who are first to litigate an issue.  
Although hardly a cure-all, Rule 24(a)(2) mitigates stare decisis’s 
process issues. Under Rule 24(a)(2), a party whose interest will 
potentially be impaired by a given case’s stare decisis effect has the 
ability to intervene and so influence the result. Even when a future 
party cannot intervene itself, the probability that an intervenor’s 
interests will anticipate—and in a sense represent—those of the future 
party increases under Rule 24(a)(2). Perhaps more important, Rule 
24(a)(2) intervention potentially increases the quality of judicial 
decisionmaking by increasing the amount of information and number 
of perspectives represented in a given case. Conveniently, Rule 
24(a)(2) also provides a court the ability to limit the scope of an 
intervenor’s participation, allowing judges to exploit the Rule’s 
informative benefits while limiting procedural complication.  
Requiring that intervenors satisfy Article III standing robs parties 
and the federal judiciary of these potential benefits. It would be one 
thing if Article III clearly applied to Rule 24(a)(2). The Constitution 
has stood in the way of change before—that, fundamentally, is its 
purpose. But the use of Article III standing to bar intervention once a 
justiciable case or controversy has been established is an 
extraconstitutional use of the doctrine. In any event, it is a cruder-than-
necessary tool to address the “floodgates” concern expressed by the 
Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits.  
The Brennan Center did not move to intervene in Crawford, and 
it is far from clear that its intervention would have changed the 
outcome of the case. But regardless of one’s views on the merits of 
voter identification laws, surely we would all prefer a judicial system in 
which some of our most esteemed federal judges did not regret—and 
blame on inadequate information—their most significant decisions.  
 
 258. GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1993).  
 259. Hart, supra note 133, at 264.  
